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The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric two-
player games with incomplete information. One model postulates that
t h et y p eo fap l a y e ri sﬁxed, and evolution works within types. In
the other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of two
types and two strategies it is shown that the stability properties of
stationary states are the same under the two dynamics when payoﬀs
do not depend on the type of the other player, but may diﬀer when
they do.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The idea of the paper is to compare two models of evolution in symmetric
incomplete information games. In a Bayesian game, the type of a player
can either be determined once (like genetically programmed preferences) or
be drawn randomly each time the player is called to play the game (think
of a series of auctions where values for a given buyer are determined by the
object sold and so appear random to the outside observer who does not know
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1the preferences of the buyer). If change in strategies can be modeled as a
learning process, or as an evolutionary process, is the outcome diﬀerent in
the two situations?
It is well known that in terms of equilibria the two models are equivalent
(this follows from the correspondence between mixed and behavior strategies
in Kuhn, 1953). Following Harsanyi (1967-68), incomplete information about
types of players can be modeled as imperfect information. Nature determines
types of players and then the game is played. This game can be converted into
a normal form, on which evolution can be analyzed by standard methods.
This corresponds to the second model described above (types determined
randomly each period, and type-contingent strategies evolve). The diﬀerence
between models may come from the fact that when the type of a player is
determined once and for all, he cannot switch between certain strategies in
the normal form representation of the extensive form game with imperfect
information. But is it important, i.e. does it lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences?
A literal interpretation of evolutionary models is usually one of a large
population of individuals, each playing a pure strategy. Individuals are ran-
domly matched to play a given game. We consider simultaneous move games
where individuals know own type but not the type of the other player.
In the ﬁrst model the population is divided into subpopulations corre-
sponding to types. In each subpopulation there is an evolutionary process,
but the ﬁtness of a strategy depends also on what strategies other types are
playing. The subpopulations may be of diﬀerent sizes, which are given by
the distribution of types in the population, but each individual is matched
every time, either with a player of own type or with players of other types.
The speed of evolution is the same in all subpopulations.
In the second model, each period players are divided into types according
to the given distribution. If a player is more likely to be of a certain type, the
type-contingent strategy for this type evolves faster than for other types. It
turns out that the relative speed of evolution for type-contingent strategies
does matter in some games.
Though the paper concerns mostly economic examples, in biological terms
the diﬀerence between models may be seen as following. Being of diﬀerent
types is like having diﬀerent genomes; if genomes are independent, the ﬁrst
model is more appropriate. If more sophisticated genes are considered, like
genes for conditional behavior, the second model is more appropriate.
22 Models of Evolution in Symmetric Games
with Incomplete Information
The underlying situation to be analyzed is as follows. Individuals in a large
population are randomly matched to interact. The individuals can be of
several types, which can be interpreted as having diﬀerent preferences. The
individuals know their own type but not the type of other players. They take
decisions simultaneously and payoﬀs are realized.
One example of such a situation in economics is a sealed-bid auction.
Bidders know their valuation, but not the valuation of other bidders. They
submit bids simultaneously, and the rules of the auction determine who gets
the object and how much each bidder pays. Further examples in economics
are oligopoly with cost uncertainty, or bargaining with incomplete informa-
tion.
Some situations in biology can be described by this model. Individuals in
as p e c i e sm a yb e” s t r o n g ”o r” w e a k ”b u tt h i si sn o ts h o w nb ya n ye x t e r n a l
features. In an encounter, an individual has to choose certain action without
knowing the type of the other individual.
W ec o n s i d e rt w o - p l a y e rg a m e s .W ea s s u m et h a tt h eg a m ei ss y m m e t r i c ,
i.e. both players in an interaction face the same situation. Let the ﬁnite
s e to ft y p e sf o re a c hp l a y e rb eT = {t1,...,t n},a n dl e tµ = {µ1,...,µ n}
be a probability distribution on the set of types, with µi > 0,
Pn
i=1 µi =1 .
Thus µi is the probability (or the belief) that the other player is of type
ti. We assume that the set of available strategies does not depend on the
type of the player. Let this common set of strategies be S = {s1,...,s m}.
If player 1 is of type ti and chooses strategy sk,a n dp l a y e r2i so ft y p etj
and chooses strategy sl, the payoﬀsa r euti,tj(sk,s l),u tj,ti(sl,s k). In the most
general case the payoﬀs depend on own type, the type of the other player,
and on strategies of the players. In most of economic examples, like the
auction example, the payoﬀs do not depend on the valuation (i.e. type) of
the other player, only on own valuation, and on strategies of both players.
In the biological example, the payoﬀs may depend on the type (”strong” or
”weak”) of the other player, as well as on strategies of both players.
As mentioned in the introduction, the type of an individual can be either
determined once before a series of interactions, or before each interaction.
Correspondingly, one can formulate two models of evolution.
E v o l u t i o nw i t h i nt y p e s In the ﬁrst model, the model of evolution within
types, the population is divided into n subpopulations, one for each type.
Within each subpopulation, there is an evolutionary process on strategies,
3and these processes are interdependent because payoﬀ to a strategy for a
given type depends on the strategies of other types. Let xi
k be the proportion







luti,tj(sk,s l). In a payoﬀ monotone
evolutionary dynamic (Weibull, 1995, Ch.4), the proportion of players of
type ti using strategy sk grows relative to the proportion of players of type
ti using strategy sl if uti(sk) >u ti(sl). We will work with one particular





k(uti(sk) − uti)( 1 )
where uti = xi
k
Pm
k=1 uti(sk) is the average payoﬀ in the subpopulation of
type ti.
In the economic context, this model of evolution corresponds to a situa-
tion when the type of a player is determined before a series of interactions,
for example, the cost structure of a duopolist before engaging in competition
with other ﬁrms in several markets, or the type of a bargainer before several
bargaining situations. The replicator dynamic can then be interpreted as the
reduced form of a learning process given the type (e.g. the preferences) of
an individual, as in Weibull (1995, Ch.4).
In the biological context, the model can be interpreted as follows. One
gene determines the type of an individual, but not external features. The
proportion of individuals with a given allele of this gene is ﬁxed (it is possible
to model the evolution of types also but this will not be pursued here).
Another gene determines individual’s strategy, and it is the proportions of
alleles of this gene that evolve.
Evolution of type-contingent strategies The second model of evolution
assumes that the type of an individual is determined randomly (according
to distribution µ) before each interaction, and so each individual has type-
contingent strategies ”play sk if type ti”. Let xk1...kn be the proportion of
players that use type-contingent strategy ”play sk1 if type t1, ... , play skn
if type tn”. The expected payoﬀ of such an individual is u(sk1 ...s kn)= Pn
i=1 µiuti(ski), where uti(skl) is the expected payoﬀ when type ti as given




kj=l xk1...kn being the proportion of
players that have ”..., play skl if type tj, ...” in their strategy. Again, in
ap a y o ﬀ monotone selection dynamic, the proportion of players using one
strategy grows relative to the proportion of players using another strategy if
u(sk1 ...s kn) >u (sl1 ...s ln). The replicator dynamic in this case is
˙ xk1...kn = xk1...kn(u(sk1 ...s kn) − u)( 2 )
4where u =
P(sn...sn)
(s1...s1) xk1...knu(sk1 ...s kn) is the average payoﬀ in the popula-
tion.
T h i sm o d e lo fe v o l u t i o n ,i nt h ee c o n o m i cc o n t e x t ,c o r r e s p o n d st oas i t u -
a t i o nw h e r et h et y p eo fap l a y e rr e p r e s ents private information (rather than
his preferences) that can change from interaction to interaction. Auction is
a good example, since valuations can change from one auction to the next.
In biological context type-contingent strategies correspond to the genes
that encode complicated instructions of playing conditional strategies. There
is one population of individuals, and in each interaction an individual ﬁnds
itself in a certain role, like ”owner” or ”intruder”. The identiﬁcation of roles,
however, is imperfect, and so the individual does not know the role of the
other player. Since each individual may ﬁnd itself in each role, genes that
encode conditional strategies evolve.
Basic diﬀerences and similarities The situation under the dynamic
within types is described by n distributions on m strategies for each type, or
by n(m − 1) independent variables. This description is equivalent to speci-
fying a behavior strategy (Kuhn, 1953) for the game. Under the dynamic on
type-contingent strategies the sutiation is given by one distribution on mn
strategies, i.e. by mn − 1 variables. This description is equivalent to mixed
strategies for the normal form of the game. For each mixed strategy there is
a realization-equivalent behavior strategy, and for each fully mixed behavior
strategy there are many realization-equivalent mixed strategies.
Equilibria of the game can be found by looking at either of the descrip-
tions. It is usually easier to ﬁnd equilibria through behavior strategies.
Equilibria are stationary under either of the dynamics, but each equilibrium
in fully mixed behavior strategies corresponds to a hyperplane of equilibria
in mixed strategies. The stability properties of an equilibrium in behavior
strategies can be compared with the stability properties of the corresponding
set of equilibria in mixed strategies.
3 The Case of Two Types and Two Strategies
3.1 General Case
We restrict ourselves to the situations where there are only two types and
two strategies that players can choose. Let the space of types be T = {t1,t 2},
and the distribution is given by one parameter 0 <µ<1, the probability of
being type t1 (thus the probability of being type t2 is 1 − µ). Furthermore,


















i.e. matrix A =( aij)g i v e st h ep a y o ﬀsw h e np l a y e ro ft y p et1 meet another
player of type t1, B is the payoﬀ matrix when two players of type t2 meet,
C is the payoﬀ matrix when type t1 meets type t2,a n dD is when type t2
meets t1.
Dynamic within types and equilibria Let x1 be the distribution of














is the distribution of strategies for type t2.L e tei ∈ R2 be the unit
vector with 1 on the i-th coordinate. Then the replicator dynamic within















1 +( 1− µ)Bx
2)) (4)









1 +( 1− µ)(c1 − c2)x
2









1 +( 1− µ)(b1 − b2)x
2
1 + µd2 +( 1− µ)b2)( 6 )
where a1 = a11−a21,a 2 = a12−a22 and bi,c i,d i are deﬁned analogously. The
corner states, or the states on the boundary (where at least one xi
1 = 0 or 1)
may be stationary under the dynamic because new strategies cannot appear,
but not all of them are equilibria. For such a state to be an equilibrium, the
last terms in the equations should not be pointing inside the state space of
the dynamic, the unit square.
It can be seen that apart from corner pure equilibria and boundary
partially mixed equilibria, there can be a fully mixed interior equilibrium
where lines µ(a1 − a2)x1
1 +( 1− µ)(c1 − c2)x2
1 + µa2 +( 1− µ)c2 =0a n d
µ(d1 − d2)x1
1 +( 1−µ)(b1 − b2)x2
1 +µd2 +( 1− µ)b2 = 0 intersect, and in the
non-generic case when these lines coincide there is a line of interior equilibria.
6Depending on the payoﬀs there may be several situations involving pure,
partially mixed, and fully mixed equilibria, several of which are illustrated
on the examples below.
Example 1 Hawk-dove game with incomplete information.
Suppose individuals can be of two types, ”strong” (s)a n d” w e a k ”( w). In
an interaction, they can either escalate (e)o rr e t r e a t( r). In an interaction of
individuals of the same type the game is the usual hawk-dove one. A strong
type always wins a ﬁght against a weak type when the conﬂict escalates,











strong vs. weak :
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where Vs,V w are the values of the contested resource for corresponding types,
and Cs,C w are the costs of the ﬁght. We assume that 1
2Vi − Ci < 0,i= s,w
and Cs <C w.L e tµ be the proportion of the strong type.
The change in x1





and the change in x2





0. These two lines either coincide (in non-generic case 2Cs
Vs = 2Cw+Vw
Vw ), or in-
tersect outside the unit square. Thus there is no isolated interior equilibrium,
and generically all equilibria are on the boundary. Figure 1 shows some pos-
sibilities. Note that it is possible to have equilibrium in which the weak type
escalates and the strong one retreats, if the value of the resource is too low
for the strong type.
Example 2 Game with isolated interior equilibrium.
Suppose there are two types. One type (c) wants to match the strategy of
the opponent, while the other type (n) wants to play an action diﬀerent from


























Figure 1: Phase diagram for Hawk-Dove game with µ = 3
4,V w =1 ,C s =
3




























1 − 6(1 − µ)x
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2 is an equilibrium for any µ. The dynamic rotates
around this point, as illustrated in Figure 2.








with detJ = µ(1−µ)5
4 > 0a n dtrJ = 1
2 − 5
2µ. The equilibrium is asymptot-
ically stable for µ>1
5, is a center surrounded by periodic orbits for µ = 1
5,
and unstable for µ<1
5.
Dynamic of type-contingent strategies The normal form of the game
with 2 types and 2 strategies is a 4×4 matrix M. The elements of M can be
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for the game in Example 2 with µ = 1
4.
is suﬃcient to specify the expected payoﬀ of a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆4 against
another strategy y.I no u rc a s ei ti sg i v e nb y
x · My = µ(x
1 · (µAy
1 +( 1− µ)Cy
2)) + (1 − µ)(x
2 · (µDy
1 +( 1− µ)By
2))
where x1,y1 are behavior strategies of type t1 derived from mixed strategies
x,y (and correspondingly x2,y2 are behavior strategies of type t2). If xsisj is











The replicator dynamic of type-contingent strategies is
˙ xij = xij[(fij − x) · Mx]( 9 )
where fij is the 4-dimensional unit vector with 1 on the place corresponding
to xij and 0 on other places.
For each interior equilibrium (x1
1,x 2
1) of the dynamic within types there is









1}), of the dynamic of type-contingent
strategies.








xil ((fik − fil) · Mx)=
xik
















xjk[(el − ek) ·




xjk is invariant. Manifolds WK = {x :
x11x22 = Kx12x21} are invariant for any K>0, i.e. trajectories that start
on a given manifold stay on this manifold.
9Since x11 + x12 + x21 + x22 =1a n dx11x22 = Kx12x21,f o rg i v e nK there
are only two independent variables. The dynamic foliates into a set of 2-
dimensional dynamics, one for each invariant manifold. All manifolds have
the same borders x1
1 =0 ,x 1
1 =1 ,x 2
1 =0 ,x 2
1 = 1. For an interior equi-
librium (x1
1,x 2
1) each invariant manifold contains exactly one corresponding
equilibrium in the normal form space.
On each manifold the dynamic of behavior strategies x1
1,x 2
1 can be ana-
lyzed. Since x1
1 = x11+x12,x 2
1 = x11+x21 the dynamic of behavior strategies
induced by the dynamic of mixed strategies in the normal form is
˙ x
1
1 =( x11(f11 − x)+x12(f12 − x)) · Mx (10)
˙ x
2
1 =( x11(f11 − x)+x21(f21 − x)) · Mx (11)









1 +( 1− µ)cx
2
1 + µa2 +( 1− µ)c2)] +
(1 − µ)[(x11x22 − x12x21)(µdx
1
1 +( 1− µ)bx
2
1 + µd2 +( 1− µ)b2)]
˙ x
2
1 = µ[(x11x22 − x12x21)(µax
1
1 +( 1− µ)cx
2







1 +( 1− µ)bx
2
1 + µd2 +( 1− µ)b2)]
where a = a1 − a2 and analogously for b,c,d.









1 +( 1− µ)(c1 − c2)x
2
1 + µa2 +( 1− µ)c2)]
˙ x
2






1 +( 1− µ)(b1 − b2)x
2
1 + µd2 +( 1− µ)b2)]
The diﬀerence of these equations from the equations of the dynamic within
types is only in the multiplicative terms µ and 1 − µ. When the dynamic
within types involves a fully mixed equilibrium, the stability properties of this
equilibrium may change depending on these multiplicative terms. If µ 6= 1
2,
the fully mixed equilibrium can have diﬀerent stability properties even in the
dynamic within types and the dynamic on manifold W1.
Example 3 Example 2 continued.
With the multiplicative terms, the Jacobian of the dynamic in the ex-





2µ(1 − µ) 1
2(1 − µ)2
¸
.T h e nd e t J0 = µ2(1 − µ)2 5
4 > 0,
and trJ0 = −2µ2 + 1
2(1 − µ)2 = 1
2(−3µ2 − 2µ +1 ) . I th o l d st h a ttrJ0 > 0
when µ<1
3, trJ0 =0w h e nµ = 1
3 and trJ0 < 0w h e nµ>1













is asymptotically stable under the dynamic
within types but unstable under the dynamic on the normal form on W1.
10Claim 1 With two types and two strategies, it is possible that the equilibria
of the game have diﬀerent stability properties under the dynamic within types
and under the dynamic of type-contingent strategies.
Intuitively, even on manifold W1 the change in stability comes from the
fact that with type-contingent strategies, strategy for the more frequent type
evolves faster than for the less frequent type, while in the dynamic within
types the speed of evolution is the same for both types. For the orbits that
spiral around the fully mixed equilibrium, this change in the relative speed
is important.
If other manifolds WK,K 6= 1 are taken into account, the set of interior
equilibria is less likely to be stable, as every equilibrium in it has to be stable
on the corresponding manifold.
On the ﬁrst sight it seems to be more diﬀucult to have stability of inte-
rior equilibria (as a set) in the dynamic on the normal form, since equilibria
have to be stable on every manifold. However, the following example demon-
strates that a set of equilibria can be stable in the dynamic of type-contingent
strategies while unstable in the dynamic within types.
Example 4 Stability in type-contingent strategies and instability in the dy-
namic within types.

















and µ = 3






















































.S i n c e
detJ = 3
128 > 0a n dtrJ = 1
8 > 0, the equilibrium is unstable.


















































































on the invariant manifolds. Since x1
1 = x11 + x12,x 2
1 = x11 + x21,x 11 + x12 +
x21 + x22 =1a n dx11x22 = Kx12x21, x11 c a nb ef o u n df r o mt h ee q u a t i o n
(1 − K)x2
















K+1). The Jacobian of



























K) < 0f o r
any K, the equilibria are asymptotically stable on all manifolds WK.T h e y
are also stable on the boundary.
3.2 Payoﬀs Do Not Depend on the Type of the Other
Player
Let us return to our economic examples. In an auction the payoﬀ of a player
depends on own valuation but not on the valuation of the other player (but,
of course, it depends on the bids of both players). In duopoly, proﬁt depends
on own cost but not on the cost of the other ﬁrm. Thus, payoﬀst oap l a y e r
do not depend on the type of the other player. In terms of the previous
section, matrices A and C a r et h es a m e ,a sw e l la sm a t r i c e sB and D.









1 +( 1− µ)x
2









1 +( 1− µ)x
2
1)(b1 − b2)+b2) (15)
The lines where ˙ x1
1 =0a n d˙ x2
1 =0h a v et h es a m es l o p e−
µ
1−µ, therefore
they either do not intersect or coincide. In the case when the lines do not
intersect there is no interior equilibrium. All equilibria are either pure or
partially mixed. In the case when the lines coincide there is a continuum
(a line) of fully mixed equilibria. In either case there is no isolated interior
equilibrium, so the dynamic cannot rotate around a point.
Proposition 1 When payoﬀs do not depend on the type of the other player
there is no isolated interior equilibrium.
12Dynamic of type-contingent strategies The reduction of the dynamic









1 +( 1− µ)x
2
1)(a1 − a2)+a2]+
(1 − µ)(x11x22 − x12x21)[(µx
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1 = µ(x11x22 − x12x21)[(µx
1









1 +( 1− µ)x
2
1)(b1 − b2)+b2]
Again, the reduction of the dynamic to manifold W1 = {x : x11x22 = x12x21}
diﬀers from the dynamic within types only by the multiplicative terms µ and
1 − µ. In the generic case, when there is no interior equilibrium, the term is
not important as the dynamic cannot cycle or spiral. In the non-generic case
of the line of equilibria in the interior it may be important, as a Lyapunov
stable point on a line may become unstable (or the other way round) after
the relative speed of changes in variables alter.
Example 5 Relative speed matters in non-generic case.









where un gives the payoﬀ of type n independently of the type of the other
player, and similarly for type uc.S u p p o s eµ = 1






























The line of equilibria for the dynamic is x1
1 +3 x2




1), the second by 1
x2
1(1−x2



































1 is invariant in the dynamic. Figure 3(a) shows the
isoscales. Since the slope of them is less than the slope of the equilibrium
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Figure 3: Line of equilibria and isoscales
































Multiplying the ﬁrst equation by 3
4x1
1(1−x1






































1 is invariant in the
dynamic. Drawing the isoscales of this expression gives the picture in Figure
3(b). All equilibria on the line are unstable.
The dynamic of type-contingent strategies on W1 is equivalent to the
dynamic within types in the sense that both ˙ x1
1 and ˙ x2
1 always have the same
sign under both dynamics. On other invariant manifolds WK,K 6=1t h e
directions of the dynamics may diﬀer as ˙ xi
1 can have diﬀerent signs under the
two dynamics. However, in the generic case all equilibria are on the boundary,
and it can be shown that the stability properties of them are preserved.
Proposition 2 Generically, stability properties of equilibria do not diﬀer
under the two dynamics in the case of two types and two strategies when
payoﬀs do not depend on the type of the other player.
Proof. See Appendix.
144 Relationship to the Literature and Conclu-
sion
The games in this paper are a special case of population games as asymmetric
animal conﬂicts described in Selten (1980). The formulation of Selten’s model
is more general as it allows players to receive correlated signals, and so meet
only own type, or only other types (though Selten himself analyses only
the latter case). As a way of generalization, the probability of meeting a
particular type may be made dependent on own type of the player.
In the literature, explicit dynamic evolutionary models were analyzed for
population games with perfectly correlated signals. The case with two strate-
g i e sa n dt w ot y p e sw h e no n l yp l a y e r so ft h es a m et y p em e e ti sc o n s i d e r e di n
Cressman et al. (2000). It is shown that the two dynamics have the same
dynamic stability properties, because rotating around an interior equilibrium
is not possible with only two strategies.H o w e v e r ,w i t hm o r et h a nt w os t r a t e -
gies this does not hold anymore, as shown in Chamberland and Cressman
(2000), where an example with three strategies is given, with an equilibrium
that is asymptotically stable in the dynamic within types but not in the
dynamic on the normal form.
The opposite case when only players of diﬀerent types meet is analyzed
in Gaunersdorfer et al. (1991). Even with two types and two strategies
stability properties of stationary states may diﬀer under the two dynamics.
An equilibrium that is Lyapunov stable in the dynamic within types may
correspond to a set of equilibria on the normal form that is unstable because
equilibria on some WK,K6= 1 are unstable. In the present paper the opposite
may also happen: an equilibrium that is unstable in the dynamic within types
can be stable in the dynamic on the normal form as Example 4 shows.
In the other papers there was no need to distinguish whether payoﬀsd e -
p e n do nt h et y p eo ft h eo t h e rp l a y e ro rn o t ,a sat y p ec o u l dm e e to n l yo n e
other type (itself or the other type). This paper makes the distinction, show-
ing that it is important as the dynamics generically have the same stability
properties if payoﬀs do not depend on the type of the other player, but can
have diﬀerent properties if the payoﬀsd od e p e n do nt h et y p eo ft h eo t h e r
player. The relative speed of evolution for the two types matters when there
is an interior stationary state and the dynamics rotate around it.
The other papers consider mostly biological applications. If one takes
the view that economic situations are described by incomplete information
games, and learning can be modeled by the replicator dynamic, this paper
provides a basis for analysis of possible outcomes in economic situations.
It shows that it is important to specify how exactly learning is modeled in
15t h ec a s ew h e np a y o ﬀs depend on the type of the other player, but it is not
important when payoﬀs are independent of that type.
As we have shown, even with just two strategies the dynamics can have
quite diﬀerent properties in the case when payoﬀs depend also on the type
of the other player. With more than two strategies, even in the case when
payoﬀs do not depend on that type, it seems generically possible to have an
equilibrium partially mixed for both types. We conjecture that its stability
properties may then diﬀer between the two dynamics.
A Proof of Proposition 2































and the dynamic on the normal form by
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1 +( 1− µ)x
2
1)(b1 − b2)+b2]] = g11(x11,x 12,x 21)
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1)(b1 − b2)+b2]] = g12(x11,x 12,x 21)
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1)(a1 − a2)+a2]+
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1 = µ(x11x22 − x12x21)[(µx
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1 = x11 +x12,x 2
1 = x11 +x21,x 11 +x12 +x21 +x22 =1 ,a n dx11x22 =
Kx12x21 in the interior of the state space.
Interior stationary states in the dynamic within types exist only in the























1) − (x11x22 −
16x12x21)2 =( 1−x1
1)x12x11+x1
1x21x22, in the interior of the normal form space
it is non-zero. It may be zero in the interior of x1
1,x 2
1 space when x11,x 22 =0
or x12,x 21 = 0. Analogously, ˙ x2
1 =0i m p l i e s˙ x1
1 6= 0 in the interior of the
normal form space. Therefore, there are no interior stationary states for the
normal form dynamic in the generic case either.
On the boundary of x1
1,x 2
1 space either xi
1 =0o rxi
1 =1 . I ne i t h e r
case x11x22 − x12x21 = 0, and the directions of the dynamics coincide. In
particular, a boundary state that is stationary in the dynamic within types
is stationary in the normal form dynamic.
T h es e c o n dd y n a m i cc a nh a v em o r es t a t i o n a r ys t a t e st h a nt h eﬁrst one
(e.g. when a1 =2 ,a 2 = −1,b 1 =1 ,b 2 = −2,µ = 1
2,x 11 = x22 = 1
2,x 12 =
x21 =0t h e nx1
1 = x2
1 = 1
2 is a stationary state, while in the ﬁrst dynamic it is
not stationary). Each such state is boundary in the dynamic on the normal
f o r mb u ti n t e r i o ri nt h es p a c ex1
1,x 2
1.
Stationary states that are not equilibria are unstable. Such states are
stationary because the best response strategy for at least one of the types is
absent. If this strategy appears, its proportion will grow, so such states are
not stable in the dynamic within types. They are also not stable on W1 since
signs of ˙ x1
1 and ˙ x2
1 are preserved there. Therefore they are not stable in the
dynamic on the normal form. States that are stationary in the normal form
dynamic but not in the dynamic within types are unstable by this argument
as they are not equilibria.
If a stationary state is a strict equilibrium, then it is asymptotically stable
in both dynamics, since the equilibrium strategy is the unique best response
to all small perturbations of itself.
Consider then a boundary stationary state that is an equilibrium, which
may be pure or partially mixed, and which is not strict. In the generic case,
such an equilibrium is partially mixed, and only one of the two types is
indiﬀerent in equilibrium. Let the equilibrium be on x1
1 =0 ,l e ts2 be the
unique best response for type t1,a n dl e tt y p et2 be indiﬀerent in equilibrium
(the reasoning for an equilibrium on other boundaries is analogous). This
implies that ˙ x1
1 < 0 in a neighborhood of equilibrium, or that (µx1
1 +( 1−
µ)x2
1)(a1−a2)+a2 < 0. Also, (µx1
1+(1−µ)x2
1)(b1−b2)+b2 = 0 at equilibrium.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the dynamic within types are (µx1
1 +
(1 − µ)x2
1)(a1 − a2)+a2 < 0a n dx2
1(1 − x2
1)(1 − µ)(b1 − b2). Thus in the
generic case the equilibrium is stable iﬀ b1−b2 < 0 and unstable iﬀ b1−b2 > 0.
(b1 − b2 = 0 is not a generic case).






a2)+a2] < 0, and x21(1 − x21)(1 − µ)2(b1 − b2). If b1 − b2 < 0t h e ya r ea l l
negative, and the equilibrium is stable, while if b1 − b2 > 0, the equilibrium
17is unstable. This is the same condition as for the stability of equilibrium in
the dynamic within types, thus stability properties of equilibria in these two
dynamics coincide.
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